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I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a society that is marked by rapid technological advances. 
These new technologies present significant benefits to consumers, but 
these benefits in many cases are predicated on the disclosure and sharing
of information.  Balancing consumer protection efforts while simultaneously
providing the appropriate incentives for innovation is one of the biggest 
challenges faced by regulators. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sets the agenda for consumer
protection in the United States, and privacy is a prominent part of this 
agenda.  Despite its now central role in consumer protection, the FTC 
started as an entity focused on protecting business competitors that did
not have a consumer protection portfolio.  The origins of the FTC, including
its original jurisdictional scope, required Congress to significantly amend
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) to provide the FTC with
authority to address harms to consumers.1  This was achieved by giving
the FTC expanded ability to act to stop “deceptive” and “unfair” acts or 
practices.  Over time, both the courts and the FTC have clarified the FTC’s
jurisdiction to protect consumers, and the FTC has taken an increased
role in privacy enforcement, first through cases alleging deception, and
then through cases relying upon the FTC’s unfairness authority.2 
The FTC recently issued guidance, Protecting Consumer Privacy in
an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and 
Policymakers, which identified the successes the FTC has had in privacy 
enforcement, including its continuing efforts with international outreach,3 as
well as some continuing issues with current enforcement and data protection
regimes.  As noted by the opening sentences of the report: 
 In today’s digital economy, consumer information is more important than 
ever.  Companies are using this information in innovative ways to provide 
consumers with new and better products and services.  Although many of these 
companies manage consumer information responsibly, some appear to treat it in an
irresponsible or even reckless manner.  And while recent announcements of privacy
1. See generally Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). 
 2. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS 3–6 (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf. 
3. Id. at 12 (“In recent years, the Commission has continued to employ a range of 
tools—including law enforcement, consumer and business education, policymaking, and 
international outreach—in pursuing its consumer privacy initiatives.”).
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innovations by a range of companies are encouraging, many companies—both 
online and offline—do not adequately address consumer privacy interests.4  
Said differently, although some companies have voluntarily taken steps to
improve privacy and adopt best practices, not all companies have.  In 
light of this, the report proposes a new framework for companies in
order to further encourage the development of best practices and self-
regulation and to guide Congress.5  It also places the FTC’s prior privacy 
enforcement efforts in two categories—the “notice-and-choice” and 
“harm-based” models.6  Although no prior article has attempted to correlate
these concepts to the FTC’s jurisdiction, as argued below, the notice-
and-choice model corresponds to the FTC’s deception authority, and the
harm-based model corresponds to its unfairness authority.  The FTC’s
recent report also recognized that technological changes in society may
call these constructs into question and ultimately suggested a new 
framework—“privacy-by-design.”7 
The FTC is not the only entity looking at how to solve these issues. 
Several groups and commentators have made suggestions regarding
what model of privacy will help change the path of privacy.  These 
include models based upon accountability, as well as models that focus 
on restrictions on data processing, also at times known as use-limitations 
models.  Another proposed structure is one I identified in 2008, known
as Privacy 3.0, which relies upon proportionality to identify appropriate 
restrictions on processing and accountability.8 
This Article will first examine the origins of the FTC, then review the 
current structure and jurisdiction of the FTC for consumer protection and 
also track the efforts to define the FTC’s authority over deceptive and 
unfair practices.  It will examine the FTC’s use of its deception and 
unfairness authority in privacy enforcement cases, then examine three
proposed theoretical models for privacy, and finally propose a framework
that would provide guidance for industry and permit privacy issues to be 
more proactively addressed.  The framework will build upon best practices 
and the privacy-by-design concepts by creating a framework based upon 
risk of harm, or sensitivity.  The framework would be a voluntary program,
4. Id. at i.
5. Id. (“This proposal is intended to inform policymakers, including Congress, as 
they develop solutions, policies, and potential laws governing privacy, and guide and
motivate industry as it develops more robust and effective best practices and self-
regulatory guidelines.”). 
6. Id. at iii.
7. Id. at v.  “In addition, both models have struggled to keep pace with the rapid 
growth of technologies and business models that enable companies to collect and use
consumers’ information in ways that often are invisible to consumers.” Id. at iii.
8. Andrew B. Serwin, Privacy 3.0—The Principle of Proportionality, 42 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 869, 900 (2009). 
812
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administered by the FTC, but it would offer those businesses that choose to
enter the program a safe harbor from enforcement if the safe harbor 
requirements are met.  The safe harbor proposal in this Article is a new
element, but one that would likely further encourage companies to adopt
best practices. 
II. WHAT ARE THE ISSUES PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT? 
The FTC’s recent report, which was in part based upon a series of
roundtables, stated the current privacy issues as follows: 
Stakeholders emphasized the need to improve transparency, simplify the ability of
consumers to exercise choices about how their information is collected and used, 
and ensure that businesses take privacy-protective measures as they develop and
implement systems.  At the same time, commenters and participants urged regulators 
to be cautious about restricting the exchange and use of consumer data in order
to preserve the substantial consumer benefits made possible through the flow of
information. Participants noted, for example, that the acquisition, exchange, and use
of consumer data not only helps to fund a variety of personalized content and
services, but also allows businesses to innovate and develop new products and
services that offer consumers convenience and cost savings.9 
Thus, the balance that the FTC is trying to strike is to protect consumers 
in an environment where the FTC perceives notice-and-choice and 
harm-based models to be failing, while simultaneously not stifling 
consumer choice or innovation.
Although the United States is clearly the focus for the FTC, it is also
equally clear that the FTC recognizes the global nature of these issues 
and is actively trying to increase coordination and cooperation with foreign 
governments.  As recognized by the report:
   International enforcement and policy cooperation also has become more important
with the proliferation of complex cross-border data flows and cloud computing.
To protect consumers in this rapidly changing environment, the FTC participates in
various international policy initiatives, including those in multilateral organizations
such as the OECD and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (“APEC”). 
Within the OECD, the FTC has participated in the Working Party on Information
Security and Privacy, which led the development of the 2007 OECD Council’s
Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws
Protecting Privacy . . . .  In APEC, the FTC has been actively involved in an
initiative to establish a self-regulatory framework governing the privacy of data 
transfers throughout the APEC region.10 
 9. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at iv. 
10. Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).  The FTC also noted that in 2007 there was a 
recommendation from the OECD that OECD member countries should foster the
 813
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III. THE FTC—A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A.  The Formation of the FTC 
The FTC was originally created in 1914 in order to protect competition
among businesses.  The original FTCA was enacted concurrently with 
the Clayton Act, the nation’s first antitrust law, which links the FTC’s 
original focus to ensuring a level playing field for businesses rather than 
the consumer protection focus we see today.11  The original powers of 
the agency certainly did not include authority outside the examination of
anticompetitive actions and antitrust violations.  If one were to view 
what the FTC was in 1914, it would have primarily consisted of what is 
now known as the Bureau of Competition.12 
This stands in stark contrast to the FTC of today, which on its website 
brands itself as the “nation’s consumer protection agency.”13  The FTC’s 
self-professed agenda is “to prevent fraud, deception, and unfair business
practices in the marketplace.”14  The change in focus for the FTC to 
include consumer protection was achieved via amendments to section 5 
of the FTCA in 1938 when the FTCA was extended to cover consumers, 
primarily through the addition of authority to address unfair and deceptive 
acts or practices.15  The 1938 amendments also granted the FTC more
establishment of an informal network of privacy enforcement authorities and cooperate with
each other to address cross-border issues arising from enforcement of privacy laws.  See
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS-BORDER
CO-OPERATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS PROTECTING PRIVACY 7 (2007), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/28/38770483.pdf; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, FTC and Internatonal Privacy Enforcement Authorities Launch Global Privacy
Cooperation Network and Website (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 
2010/09/worldprivacy.shtm. 
11. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006)); Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 
Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006) and
29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006)). 
12. About the Bureau of Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bc/about.shtm (last modified May 20, 2009). 
13. Welcome to the Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/index.shtml (last modified Feb. 1, 2011). 
14. Id.
15. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 235, 244 (1972) (“The
amendment added the phrase ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ to the section’s 
original ban on ‘unfair methods of competition’ and thus made it clear that Congress, through 
§ 5, charged the FTC with protecting consumers as well as competitors.  The House
Report on the amendment summarized congressional thinking: ‘[T]his amendment makes the
consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern, before the 
law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest 
competitor.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-1613, at 2–3 (1937))); see also FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384 (1965); Guziak v. FTC, 361 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir.
1966); S. REP. NO. 74-1705, at 2–3 (1936). 
814
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flexibility in addressing practices before they reached a conclusion and 
had a significant and long-term effect.16 
B.  The History of Privacy Enforcement
The FTC’s first foray into consumer privacy was in the 1970s when it 
was granted authority to enforce the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or FCRA 
as it is commonly known.17  The FTC has subsequently expanded its
efforts to protect consumers’ privacy through enforcement as well as
other initiatives.  These efforts have been focused on two models: the 
notice-and-choice model and the harm-based model.18 
For the FTC, the notice-and-choice model began in 2000, with the 
FTC recommending that Congress require businesses to comply with the 
fair information practice principles, which include notice-and-choice.19 
Congress did not pass this legislation, so the FTC focused initially on 
raising public awareness, encouraging self-regulation, and also bringing 
cases under section 5 based upon its deception authority.20  Deception, as 
16. Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941) (“And as
previously pointed out, it was the object of the Federal Trade Commission Act to reach 
not merely in their fruition but also in their incipiency combinations which could lead to 
these and other trade restraints and practices deemed undesirable.”); Keasbey & Mattison 
Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 940, 946 (6th Cir. 1947); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 
182 (6th Cir. 1941). 
 17. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at ii. 
18. Id. at iii.
19. Id. at D-1. 
20. The FTC noted: 
In 2000, the Commission reported to Congress that, although there had been
improvement in industry self-regulatory efforts to develop and post privacy
policies online, only about one-quarter of the privacy policies surveyed addressed 
the four fair information practice principles of notice, choice, access, and
security.  Accordingly, a majority of the Commission concluded that legislation 
requiring online businesses to comply with these principles, in conjunction with
self-regulation, would allow the electronic marketplace to reach its full potential
and give consumers the confidence they need to participate fully in that
marketplace.  Although Congress did not enact the recommended legislation, 
the Commission’s work during this time—particularly its surveys, reports, and
workshops—raised public awareness about consumer privacy and led companies to
examine their information collection practices and to post privacy policies.
It also encouraged self-regulatory efforts designed to benefit consumers,
improvements in privacy-enhancing technologies, and the creation of online
privacy certification programs.
During this period, the Commission also used its Section 5 authority to bring 
actions against companies that engaged in unfair or deceptive information 
practices.  Most of these early cases involved deceptive statements in companies’ 
 815



























   
 
noted below, focuses on what “material” information the consumer was
or was not told, particularly where the deception impacts a consumer’s
choice regarding goods or services.  Moreover, although injury is a 
factor that is considered in deception cases, the analysis of injury is part
of an examination of whether the allegedly misleading information was 
material, and actual injury is not required.  Instead, the FTC must simply
show that consumers are “likely to suffer injury from a material
misrepresentation.”21 
The second enforcement model, the harm-based approach, represented 
a departure from the notice-and-choice model.  Although the FTC 
continued to use deception in its cases, later cases focused more on actual 
consumer injury—typically resulting from an alleged breach—and the FTC 
began instead to rely more on its unfairness authority.  As discussed
below, the FTC’s unfairness authority does not focus on what was told 
to the consumer but rather whether the consumer suffered “substantial” 
injury.22 
Both models have faced criticism, including that the notice-and-choice 
model has led to lengthy and incomprehensible privacy statements and 
that the harm-based model does not adequately reflect all potential harms
from privacy concerns.  In addition, both models suffer shortcomings in
adapting to rapid changes in technology.23  However, these models, 
despite their criticisms, are key to understanding the FTC’s pattern of 
enforcement and beginning the discussion on the appropriate theoretical 
model for the future. 
IV. THE FTC’S JURISDICTION
Understanding the main grounds for FTC actions, including those that 
are not regularly at issue in privacy matters, is helpful in understanding 
the overall basis of FTC actions.  There are a number of statutes that the
FTC has been charged with enforcing, but the main source of FTC
jurisdiction is based upon “unlawful” practices under the FTCA, and the 
two main bases for finding a practice to be unlawful are sections 5 and 
privacy notices about their collection and use of consumers’ data. The
legal theories in these early enforcement actions highlighted, in particular, the 
fair information practice principles of notice and choice (the “notice-and-
choice approach”).  Collectively, the Commission’s policy and enforcement efforts
underscored its emphasis on the concepts of transparency and accountability for
information practices.
Id. at 8–9 (footnotes omitted). 
21. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 166 (1984). 
22. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006)). 
 23. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii. 
816
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12 of the FTCA, also known as 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 and 52, respectively.24 
Section 5 prohibits deceptive and unfair acts or practices, and section 12
prohibits false advertisements.25  The FTC also has responsibility for
enforcement of a number of other laws, including the FCRA, one of the 
United States’ first federal privacy laws, as well as others such as
Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act (COPPA).26 
Although these other grounds for enforcement can have implications 
for privacy, the main focus of the FTC, and consequently of this Article,
will be section 5 and the FTC’s authority regarding deception and unfair 
practices or acts. 
V. UNDERSTANDING THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE FTC’S  
PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT
Before the FTC’s deception and unfairness authority are examined in 
detail, the theory underlying the FTC’s prior thinking, as well as privacy
laws generally, should be explored to help provide a framework for the 
analysis of section 5 and the FTC’s enforcement cases. 
In prior works I have identified the first theoretical construct of 
privacy as originating in a famous Warren and Brandeis law review 
article, The Right to Privacy, which is characterized by “the right to be
let alone.”27  I have conceptualized this period as “Privacy 1.0,” and the 
driving concern at the time regarding privacy was the technological 
advances of the time, including the instant camera.28  Notably, Warren 
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52 (2006). 
25. Id. Like many state versions of the FTCA, a false advertisement that violates
section 12 is both independently unlawful and a violation of section 5.  15 U.S.C. § 52(b); see
also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (West 2008). 
 26. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at ii, 4; Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy (last visited Aug. 31, 2011); see Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 106, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.); 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 112 Stat. 2681
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 (2006)). 
27. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 193 (1890). 
28. I previously noted:  
While privacy was not invented by Warren and Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy was, and remains, the defining moment for privacy in the United States.
Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that their privacy theory was the 
foundation for privacy law in the United States, hence Privacy 1.0.
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and Brandeis rejected harm-based models when they championed the 
right to be let alone.29 A different way to understand the right to be let 
alone is to consider it as a notice-and-choice model.  One cannot truly 
exercise the right to be let alone unless there is notice—an understanding
of the potential occurrence—of the potential privacy invasion, and you 
have the opportunity to choose to be let alone—freedom to determine 
when and where one’s information is disclosed or used. 
Although Privacy 1.0 provided some structure for privacy, it did not 
completely answer the questions that courts and commentators were
asking, particularly as technology advanced.  Dean Prosser attempted to 
cure this by examining cases that resulted from the Privacy 1.0
construct, and he ultimately concluded that a harm-based model, which
was later memorialized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, was the
Warren and Brandeis were deeply concerned about the inability of the common
law to protect an individual’s privacy, particularly at a time of technological 
advances: 
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the 
refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so
that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be 
inflicted by mere bodily injury.
The technological advance that caused the most concern was the instant camera.
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step 
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to 
the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let alone.”  Instantaneous 
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts 
of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to 
make good the prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops.” . . .  Of the desirability—indeed of the
necessity—of some such protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt.
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency.  Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the 
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as 
effrontery.
    While the problem was clearly identified by Warren and Brandeis, finding a legal 
theory that provided adequate protection proved more difficult.  They first 
considered the law of defamation as a model for invasions of privacy: 
Owing to the nature of the instruments by which privacy is invaded, the 
injury inflicted bears a superficial resemblance to the wrongs dealt with 
by the law of slander and of libel, while a legal remedy for such injury
seems to involve the treatment of mere wounded feelings, as a substantive 
cause of action.
However, the law of defamation was ultimately rejected because it was
based upon a “radically different class” of damages to an individual.  This was 
in part because, if the action was otherwise lawful, common law, unlike Roman
law, did not recognize a claim for mere mental injury.
Serwin, supra note 8, at 877–79 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 27, at 195–97). 
29. See id.
818
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appropriate model.30  This harm-based model was “Privacy 2.0,” and it 
ultimately resulted in the four now-familiar privacy torts.31 
The FTC has used similar models and characterized them in the same
terms, but it identifies the timing of Privacy 1.0 and 2.0 a bit
differently.32 As noted in Part III.B, the FTC has primarily used two 
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 31. I previously noted: 
While groundbreaking, Privacy 1.0 did not provide all of the structure 
needed by courts, particularly as technology advanced and concerns over privacy 
changed.  Dean Prosser noted this disconnect in 1960: 
Judge Biggs has described the present state of the law of privacy as “still
that of a haystack in a hurricane.”  Disarray there certainly is; but almost
all of the confusion is due to a failure to separate and distinguish these 
four forms of invasions, and to realize that they call for different things. 
Dean Prosser attempted to cure the disarray by creating the next theoretical 
construct of privacy—Privacy 2.0—by following a closely related path.  In
1960, Dean Prosser examined a number of the cases that flowed from the 
Warren and Brandeis theory and categorized them into one of four categories,
which ultimately served as the basis for the Restatement’s four categories of 
privacy torts: intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, publicity
given to private life, and publicity placing a person in false light.  While Dean 
Prosser’s goal was a noble one, the current commentary on privacy suggests that 
the hurricane is still blowing quite strongly.
Serwin, supra note 8, at 883 (footnote omitted) (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 407 (1960)). 
32. Commissioner Julie Brill noted: 
Let us go back and think about the early stages of privacy regulation in the 
1990s.  “Privacy 1.0,” from my perspective, was the “Notice and Choice” 
Model.  We called it the “Fair Information Practices” principles. Although you 
might not be familiar with that title, everyone is familiar with the underlying 
principles.  During this stage, the FTC and the states looked at privacy issues 
through a regulatory framework that called for notice, choice, access, and
security with respect to information.  We evaluated privacy policies that way: 
privacy policies on the web, practices of companies, and various self-regulatory
regimes were all examined through the lens of Fair Information Practices.
The FTC, the states, and many consumer advocates called on Congress to 
enact these Notice and Choice principles into law.  However, Congress did not 
enact sweeping legislation on these broad principles. But it did enact the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which many of you are familiar with.  The GLB Act
embodies Notice and Choice principles.  Consumers are given a one-time notice. 
They are required to read it, understand it, and make an intelligent choice that 
often will last for a long time.  It is an interesting model and I am going to
have some thoughts and critiques about it in a moment. 
 Shortly after GLB was enacted, the Federal Trade Commission, as some of 
you know, switched gears, and moved from “Privacy 1.0” to “Privacy 2.0.”  It 
moved from a regulatory framework focused on Fair Information Practices to 
one focused on principles of harm. The Harm Model was first launched by
former FTC Chairman Tim Muris, but it since has been embraced by many
people, including in the states.  The Harm Model focuses on harmful privacy
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different models to promote consumer privacy: a notice-and-choice 
model, characterized by the fair information practice principles, and a 
harm-based approach.33  The FTC recognizes that these models have 
been subject to criticisms, including that they have failed to keep pace 
with rapidly evolving technology.34  The notice-and-choice model has
resulted in lengthy privacy policies, drafted primarily by lawyers, that
the FTC feels may not always adequately disclose companies’ information 
practices in clear and understandable ways, which is actually a
predictable result if one reviews the FTC’s Deception Statement and its
focus on disclosures to consumers.  These challenges are ultimately not a
complete surprise given that these same criticisms have been leveled
against Privacy 1.0 and 2.0, and the FTC notice-and-choice and harm-
based models rely upon the same underlying theories as Warren and 
Brandeis and Prosser, respectively.
As section 5 is examined, it is also helpful to try and classify the
FTC’s authority regarding deceptive and unfair trade practices in these 
terms so that the evolution of FTC enforcement can be fully understood. 
As more fully explained below, cases that rely upon deception are 
examples of the FTC’s notice-and-choice model of enforcement, and the 
unfairness cases are examples of the FTC’s harm-based approach. 
practices that present risks of physical security or economic injury.  As a result, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the states, started focusing on data security, 
data breaches, identity theft, and children’s online privacy, as well as issues
such as spam, spyware, and telemarketing, including the Do Not Call list.
Let me expand a bit on the first two issues, data security and data breaches.
During the Privacy 2.0 timeframe, regulators focused on enhancing tools to 
address data security and data breaches.
Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Conference of Western Attorneys 
General Annual Meeting: Privacy 3.0 Panel (July 20, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
speeches/brill/100720cwagtranscription.pdf.  For a video recording of the presentation, see 
Chris Hoofnagle, Commissioner Brill and Privacy 3.0 at the CWAG Privacy Panel,
BERKELEY BLOG (July 21, 2010), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2010/07/21/commissioner-brill-
and-privacy-3-0-at-the-cwag-privacy-panel-2/.
 33. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii; see also Fair Information Practice 
Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last
modified June 25, 2007). 
 34. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii.  Indeed, if one accepts the argument 
advanced in this Article—that enforcement based upon deception is truly an example of 
the FTC-recognized notice-and-choice enforcement model, lengthy disclosure-laden
“policies” are a predictable result as companies attempt to meet their legal requirements 
and minimize their enforcement risk.
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VI. UNDERSTANDING SECTION 5 
Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, also known as 
section 5 of the FTCA,35 provides the basis for FTC actions against 
unfair and deceptive trade practices.  Specifically, “[t]he commission is 
empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . .
from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce.”36  The Commission may 
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations,37 with certain exceptions,38 
from using unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.39 
The Commission’s reach is not unlimited.  It may not prevent unfair
methods of competition involving commerce with foreign nations unless 
the competition has a direct, substantial effect on U.S. commerce.  All
remedies are available to the Commission with respect to unfair and 
deceptive acts or practices, including restitution to domestic or foreign
victims.40 
Over time, courts and the FTC worked to define FTC authority in the 
deception and unfairness arenas.41  While this was occurring, there was a
35. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 719
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006)).
36. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 235 (1972) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(6)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
 37. The term corporation includes the following: 
[A]ny company, trust, so-called Massachusetts trust, or association,
incorporated or unincorporated, which is organized to carry on business for its 
own profit or that of its members, and has shares of capital or capital stock or
certificates of interest, and any company, trust, so-called Massachusetts trust, 
or association, incorporated or unincorporated, without shares of capital or 
capital stock or certificates of interest, except partnerships, which is organized 
to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members. 
15 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 2006). 
38. These exceptions include the following: 
[B]anks, savings and loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this 
title, Federal credit unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common
carriers subject to acts which regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air 
carriers subject to part A of subtitle VII of title 49, and persons, partnerships, 
or corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act,
1921, as amended, except as provided in section 406(b) of [the Packers and
Stockyards] Act . . . .
Id. § 45(a)(2) (citations omitted).
39. Id.
 40. Id. § 45(a)(3)–(4)(B). 
41. See infra Parts VIII–IX (discussing the FTC’s and courts’ process of defining 
deception and unfairness, respectively).
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shift in the section 5 enforcement patterns as well because false
advertising and other wrongs were initially the focus of the FTC’s 
consumer agenda and privacy and information security were not focal
points for the FTC.42  Over time several section 5 cases have been 
premised upon allegations arising from privacy and information security 
issues.43 
VII. UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES—
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
In addition to enforcement authority, the FTC also has authority to 
prescribe interpretive rules and general statements of policy with respect
to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, subject 
to several requirements.44 
Generally speaking, “[p]rior to the publication of any notice of 
proposed rulemaking . . . the Commission shall publish an advance 
notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.”45  The advance 
notice must contain a brief description of the area of inquiry under 
consideration, the objectives that the Commission seeks to achieve, and 
possible regulatory alternatives under consideration by the Commission. 
It must also invite the response of interested parties with respect to such
proposed rulemaking, including any suggestions or alternative methods 
for achieving such objectives.46 
The Commission must also “submit such advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of
42. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and
on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 273 (2011); Earl W. Kintner, Federal Trade 
Commission Regulation of Advertising, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1274–76 (1966). 
43. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009)
(claiming violation of section 5 by company that obtained consumer telephone records);
Vision I Props., LLC, 139 F.T.C. 296, 299, 303 (2005) (claiming unfair act in violation
of section 5 by company for misleading representation of personal information
disclosure); GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 96–97 (1999) (claiming deceptive practices used 
in connection with use of personal information). 
44. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)–(b)(1) (2006). 
When prescribing a rule . . . the Commission shall . . . (A) publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking stating with particularity the text of the rule, including 
any alternatives, which the Commission proposes to promulgate, and the 
reason for the proposed rule; (B) allow interested persons to submit written
data, views, and arguments, and make all such submissions publicly available; 
(C) provide an opportunity for an informal hearing . . . and (D) promulgate, if
appropriate, a final rule based on the matter in the rulemaking record . . . 
together with a statement of basis and purpose. 
Id. § 57a(b)(1).
45. Id. § 57a(b)(2)(A). 
46. Id. § 57a(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
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the Senate and to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 
of Representatives.”47 
VIII. DECEPTION
Defining a deceptive trade practice was not a straightforward task. 
The FTC had to go through a process, including issuing a policy
statement to Congress, which was not initially unanimously adopted by 
all of the commissioners, in an attempt to define deception.48  The policy 
statement took the form of a letter to Congressman John D. Dingell
dated October 14, 1983, in which the FTC identified several key
elements that it considered when assessing whether an act or practice
was deceptive.  In sum, as recognized by the FTC in a later enforcement 
matter, In re Cliffdale Associates, consistent with the Policy Statement
on Deception, the Commission will find an act or practice deceptive if
“there is a representation, omission, or practice” that is “likely to 
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances” and the
representation, omission, or practice is material.49  These elements are 
based upon the factors used in earlier Commission cases identifying 
whether or not an act or practice was deceptive, though it was phrased in
a slightly different manner.50  Each of these elements is examined below. 
A.  Likely To Mislead
In its Deception Statement, the FTC discussed what it would consider 
when determining whether the act or practice was likely to deceive.  It
first noted that in making this assessment, actual deception need not 
result, though the FTC must demonstrate that a representation, omission, 
or practice occurred.  Thus, once the act or practice is established, the 
FTC must only show that it is likely to deceive.51  This requirement was 
also discussed in Cliffdale, where the FTC stated that the requirement
47. Id. § 57a(b)(2)(B). 
48. See generally Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to
Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Deception Statement], available at http://www.
ftc.gov/oia/assistance/consumerprotection/advertising/policy_deception.pdf, appended to
Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984). 
49. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 165. 
50. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 420, 423–24 (1980), aff’d, 676 F.2d 385
(9th Cir. 1982). 
 51. Deception Statement, supra note 48, at 2. 
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that an act or practice be “likely to mislead,” for example, reflects a
long-established principle that the Commission need not find actual 
deception to find that a violation of section 5 has occurred.52  The FTC 
explained this standard as follows: “In the application of [the deception]
standard to the many different factual patterns that have arisen in cases
before the Commission, certain principles have become well established. 
One is that under Section 5 actual deception of particular consumers 
need not be shown.”53 
B.  The Act or Practice Must Be Considered from the          
Perspective of the Reasonable Consumer 
The second element of deception considered by the FTC is the
requirement that the FTC examine the challenged act or practice from 
the perspective of “reasonable consumers under the circumstances.”54  In
its Deception Statement, the FTC noted that an advertiser would not be
charged with liability for every conceivable misconception, particularly
if it is misunderstood by a small or insignificant group of individuals. 
As an example, the FTC stated: 
Some people, because of ignorance or incomprehension, may be misled by even
a scrupulously honest claim.  Perhaps a few misguided souls believe, for example, 
that all “Danish pastry” is made in Denmark.  Is it therefore an actionable
deception to advertise “Danish pastry” when it is made in this country? Of course
not.  A representation does not become “false and deceptive” merely because it
will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative 
segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed.55 
52. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 165. 
53. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the 
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8350 (July 2, 1964) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 408). 
 54. Deception Statement, supra note 48, at 3. 
 55. Id. at 3 (quoting Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963)); see
also Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 311 (1983) (finding Bristol-Myer’s advertising of
Bufferin, Excederin, and Excederin P.M. to be false and misleading to the consumer
group as a whole); Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 739 (1983) (finding Sterling
Drug, Inc.’s advertising of Bayer Aspirin, Bayer Children Aspirin, Midol, Cope, and 
Vanquish misleading to the consumer group as a whole); Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
98 F.T.C. 136, 343 (1981) (finding American Home Products’ advertising of Anacin
and Arthritis Pain Formula false and misleading to the consumer group as a whole).
This was reaffirmed by the FTC’s opinion in Cliffdale, which stated:
Similarly, the requirement that an act or practice be considered from the
perspective of a ‘consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances’ is not new. 
Virtually all representations, even those that are true, can be misunderstood by
some consumers.  The Commission has long recognized that the law should
not be applied in such a way as to find that honest representations are deceptive 
simply because they are misunderstood by a few.  Thus, the Commission has 
noted that an advertisement would not be considered deceptive merely because 
824
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However, the FTC will analyze specific market segments of consumers if
the act or practice is targeted to a particular group.56 
The FTC identified a number of factors it would consider when assessing 
whether a reasonable consumer would be misled and summarized its 
views as follows:
In sum, the Commission will consider many factors in determining the reaction
of the ordinary consumer to a claim or practice.  As would any trier of fact, the 
Commission will evaluate the totality of the ad or the practice and ask questions
such as: how clear is the representation?  how conspicuous is any qualifying 
information?  how important is the omitted information?  do other sources for 
the omitted information exist?  how familiar is the public with the product or
service?57 
C.  Materiality 
The last element identified by the FTC was that the representation, 
omission, or practice be material for deception to be found.58  In essence, 
the FTC examines whether the information was important to consumers— 
whether it affected consumers’ choices.59  The starting point of this 
analysis is an examination of what claim has been made.  If the claim is
an express claim, this typically establishes the meaning of the claim 
according to the FTC.60  If the claim is implied, the FTC will examine
it could be “unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative
segment of the class of persons whom the representation is addressed.” 
In recent cases, this concept has been increasingly emphasized by the Commission.
Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 165 (footnotes omitted). 
56. Ideal Toy Corp., 64 F.T.C. 297, 310 (1964); Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. at 
1290; Deception Statement, supra note 48, at 4.
 57. Deception Statement, supra note 48, at 6. 
58. Id. at 7. 
59. The Deception Statement defined the term materiality as follows: “A ‘material’
misrepresentation or practice is one which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or
conduct regarding a product.  In other words, it is information that is important to 
consumers.  If inaccurate or omitted information is material, injury is likely.” Id. (footnote 
omitted).  In Cliffdale, the FTC formulated the standard in a similar way.  103 F.T.C. at 
165–66 (“As noted in the Commission’s policy statement, a material representation,
omission, act or practice involves information that is important to consumers and, hence, 
likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding, a product.  Consumers thus are 
likely to suffer injury from a material misrepresentation.  A review of past Commission
deception cases shows that one of the factors usually considered, either directly or 
indirectly, is whether or not a claim is material.” (footnote omitted) (citing Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136; Ford Motor Co., 84 F.T.C. 729, 735 (1974), aff’d, 547 F.2d
954 (6th Cir. 1976))); see Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in 
Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (July 2, 1964) (to
be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 408). 
 60. Deception Statement, supra note 48, at 7. 
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the representation, “including an evaluation of such factors as the entire
document, the juxtaposition of various phrases in the document, the 
nature of the claim, and the nature of the transaction.”61  This does not
require a showing of actual causation, including in advertising cases
where the FTC need not make a showing that the consumer would not 
have purchased the product at issue but for the deception.  Instead, the
FTC can show that the consumer would have been less likely to make
the purchase but for the deception.62  In  International Harvester, the
FTC stated that it “presumes that all express claims are material, and that 
implied claims are material if they pertain to the central characteristics
of the product, such as its safety, cost, or fitness for the purpose sold.”63 
D.  Summarizing the Deception Elements 
Ultimately, this test can be distilled down to three elements, and this 
formulation has been recognized by a number of courts, albeit in a 
slightly different order than discussed above.  The FTC must prove (1) a
material representation, omission, or practice (2) that is likely to mislead 
consumers (3) who are acting reasonably in the circumstances.64 As
noted above, the FTC is not required to prove that the defendants 
intended their misrepresentations to defraud or deceive or that they made
them in bad faith.65 
E.  Deception and Notice-and-Choice Models of Enforcement 
The FTC admittedly has used two enforcement models in privacy— 
notice-and-choice and consumer injury.66  When one considers the
deception doctrine’s focus on the disclosure of material facts—particularly 
those that impact consumer choice—enforcement based upon the FTC’s 
authority to stop deceptive trade practices is a clear example of privacy 
enforcement under the notice-and-choice model. 
61. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 166 (citing Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983); 
Nat’l Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 548 (1972), aff’d per curiam, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d
Cir. 1973)).
62. See Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546, 628 (1976); Travel King, Inc., 86 
F.T.C. 715, 774 (1975). 
63. Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1057 (1984) (footnote omitted). 
 64. Deception Statement, supra note 48, at 1 (providing “guidance to the public” 
regarding the “Commission’s enforcement policy against deceptive ads or practices”);
see also Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Locascio, 357 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 124
F. Supp. 2d 193, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
65. Verity Int’l, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 200 n.42; see, e.g., FTC v. World Travel 
Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 66. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii. 
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IX. UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY
The Supreme Court initially had to address two key issues regarding 
the FTC’s unfairness authority.  The first was whether the categories of 
conduct that could be considered unfair were fixed or in fact could
change over time.  In 1931, the Supreme Court answered this question, 
finding that the definition of unfairness was a fluid one that was not 
susceptible to being categorically fixed.67  The Supreme Court expanded
on this view in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., noting that when
Congress created the FTC “it explicitly considered, and rejected, the 
notion that it reduce the ambiguity of the phrase ‘unfair methods of
competition’ by tying the concept of unfairness to a common-law or
statutory standard or by enumerating the particular practices to which it 
was intended to apply.”68 
The second question the Supreme Court resolved was whether the 
FTC’s jurisdiction went beyond conduct that violated the “letter or 
67. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931); see also FTC v. R.F. Keppel 
& Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934) (“Neither the language nor the history of the Act 
suggests that Congress intended to confine the forbidden methods to fixed and
unyielding categories.”).
68. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972).  Senate Report 
597 presents the reasoning that led the Senate Committee to avoid the temptations of
precision when framing the Trade Commission Act:
The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it
would attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail 
in commerce and to forbid their continuance or whether it would, by a general 
declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine
what practices were unfair.  It concluded that the latter course would be the 
better, for the reason, as stated by one of the representatives of the Illinois
Manufacturers’ Association, that there were too many unfair practices to
define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be quite possible to
invent others. 
R.F. Keppel, 291 U.S. at 310 n.1 (citing S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 13 (1914)).  The R.F.
Keppel court opined: 
Neither the language nor the history of the Act suggests that Congress 
intended to confine the forbidden methods to fixed and unyielding categories.
The common law afforded a definition of unfair competition and, before the 
enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Sherman Act had laid its
inhibition upon combinations to restrain or monopolize interstate commerce which 
the courts had construed to include restraints upon competition in interstate 
commerce.  It would not have been a difficult feat of draftsmanship to have 
restricted the operation of the Trade Commission Act to those methods of 
competition in interstate commerce which are forbidden at common law or 
which are likely to grow into violations of the Sherman Act, if that had been 
the purpose of the legislation.
Id. at 310. 
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spirit” of antitrust laws.  In answering this question, the Supreme Court 
broke the question down into two component questions—does section 5 
permit the FTC to (1) define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, 
even though the practice does not infringe on either the letter or the spirit 
of the antitrust laws, and (2) proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in 
their effect upon consumers regardless of their nature or quality as 
competitive practices or their effect on competition?69  The Supreme 
Court concluded that the answer to both questions was “yes,” and therefore
the Court did not require the FTC to show a violation of antitrust laws to
declare a practice to be unfair.70 
Though not central to its holding, the Sperry & Hutchinson Court also 
recognized that prior FTC decisions had identified three key factors in
identifying whether an act was unfair to consumers: (1) whether the
practice injures consumers, (2) whether it violates established public 
policy, and (3) whether it is unethical or unscrupulous.71  Although these 
decisions answered two key initial questions regarding the FTC’s 
unfairness authority, a number of cases and a statement from the FTC
were necessary to help further define the somewhat elusive concept of 
unfairness.72 
A.  The FTC’s December 1980 Statement Regarding Unfairness 
On June 13, 1980, Senators Wendell Ford and John Danforth wrote 
the FTC and stated their desire to hold oversight hearings regarding the 
FTC’s unfairness authority in consumer transactions and specifically 
whether the FTC’s authority was limited to matters involving false or 
69. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 239. 
70. Id. at 233, 244 (“Congress, as previously recognized by this Court, defines the 
powers of the FTC to protect consumers as well as competitors and authorizes it to 
determine whether challenged practices, though posing no threat to competition within 
the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws, are nevertheless either unfair methods of competition,
or unfair or deceptive acts or practices.  The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 reaffirms this
broad congressional mandate . . . .  Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike 
convince us that the Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to
itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated
standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply
those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.” (citation 
omitted)).
71. Id. at 244 n.5; see also Letter from Michael Pertachuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n et al., to Hon. Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transp., and Hon. John C. Danforth, Banking Minority Member, 
Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter
Unfairness Statement], appended to Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070–76 
(1984). 
72. Although Congress clearly answered the question of whether the FTC’s jurisdiction
was limited to matters that were de facto antitrust violations, it did not clearly delineate 
the full scope of the FTC’s authority, particularly regarding its unfairness authority.
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deceptive commercial advertising.73  On December 17, 1980, recognizing 
that the definition of unfairness was not “immediately obvious,” the FTC 
responded to Senators Ford and Danforth with a letter that has become 
known as its “Unfairness Statement” and took the opportunity to state its 
views regarding the parameters of its unfairness authority.  Although the 
FTC recognized its role in defining its unfairness authority, it also
recognized that its discretion was not unlimited and in fact was subject 
to judicial review.74 
Although the Sperry & Hutchinson factors were the starting point for 
the FTC, it recognized that the doctrine had continued to evolve in the 
intervening eight years, and the factors identified by the FTC were
slightly different from those identified by the Supreme Court.  Each of 
the Sperry & Hutchinson factors is discussed below, though ultimately
the FTC in essence collapsed all three factors into the consumer injury 
prong of the Sperry & Hutchinson factors. 
1.  Consumer Injury 
Recognizing that preventing consumer injury was the focus of the 
FTCA, the FTC stated its view that consumer injury alone can be 
sufficient to support a finding that a practice is unfair.75  The Unfairness 
Statement identified three factors that the FTC would use to determine if 
there was sufficient consumer injury to satisfy the first factor of the 
Sperry & Hutchinson factors: (1) there must be substantial consumer
injury (2) that is not outweighed by any offsetting consumer or
competitive benefits that the sales practice also produces, and (3) the 
injury must be one that consumers could not have reasonably avoided.76 
In assessing the first injury factor, the FTC requires that any consumer
injury must be substantial and not based upon trivial or speculative 
 73. Unfairness Statement, supra note 71, at 1070–76. 
74. Id. at 1071–72; see, e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 249; R.F. Keppel,
291 U.S. at 314. 
 75. Unfairness Statement, supra note 71, at 1073 (“Unjustified consumer injury is 
the primary focus of the FTCA, and the most important of the three S&H criteria.  By
itself it can be sufficient to warrant a finding of unfairness.  The Commission’s ability to 
rely on an independent criterion of consumer injury is consistent with the intent of the
statute, which was to ‘[make] the consumer who may be injured by an unfair trade practice of
equal concern before the law with the merchant injured by the unfair methods of a 
dishonest competitor.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 83 CONG. REC. 3255 (1938) 
(remarks of Senator Wheeler))). 
76. Id. at 1073–74. 
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harms.77  The FTC’s view was that this would typically require monetary 
harm or unwarranted health and safety risks but would not ordinarily
include emotional impact or other “more subjective” harms.78  In one of
the few privacy cases to reference what “substantial harm” is under
section 5, the Tenth Circuit noted that the FTC had concluded that the 
posting of names and telephone records online—which caused consumers 
to incur emotional harm from being stalked or otherwise harassed and
substantial costs in changing telephone providers—caused “substantial 
injury” when it assessed whether the practices by defendants were unfair
under section 5.79 
In assessing the second injury factor, the FTC stated that it would 
consider the cost and benefit “tradeoffs” and would only find that a 
practice unfairly injures consumers if “it is injurious in its net effects,” 
which includes an examination of the costs to the parties before the FTC, 
as well as the burdens placed upon society in general.80  Finally, in
assessing the third injury factor, the FTC stated that it relied upon 
market choice to a certain degree but that the FTC would act where it
perceived that consumer choice was being impacted by the allegedly 
unfair business practice.81 
2.  Violation of Public Policy 
In assessing the second Sperry & Hutchinson factor, the FTC stated
that this factor examines whether the alleged conduct violates public 
77. Id. at 1073. 
78. Id.
79. FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2009).  This issue 
was not argued on appeal, so it is dicta, but it is one of the few published cases to even
reference this issue. 
 80. Unfairness Statement, supra note 71, at 1073–74 (“The Commission is aware
of these tradeoffs and will not find that a practice unfairly injures consumers unless it is 
injurious in its net effects.  The Commission also takes account of the various costs that a
remedy would entail.  These include not only the costs to the parties directly before the 
agency, but also the burdens on society in general in the form of increased paperwork,
increased regulatory burdens on the flow of information, reduced incentives to innovation and
capital formation, and similar matters.” (footnote omitted)).
81. Id. at 1074 (“Normally we expect the marketplace to be self-correcting, and we 
rely on consumer choice—the ability of individual consumers to make their own private 
purchasing decisions without regulatory intervention—to govern the market.  We
anticipate that consumers will survey the available alternatives, choose those that are 
most desirable, and avoid those that are inadequate or unsatisfactory.  However, it has
long been recognized that certain types of sales techniques may prevent consumers from 
effectively making their own decisions, and that corrective action may then become necessary.
Most of the Commission’s unfairness matters are brought under these circumstances. 
They are brought, not to second-guess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, but 
rather to halt some form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage
of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.”).
830
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policy “as it has been established by statute, common law, industry
practice, or otherwise.”82  This factor was used in two different ways by
the FTC: “to test the validity and strength of the evidence of consumer
injury” or, in other cases, for a “dispositive legislative or judicial
determination that such injury is present.”83 
The FTC then further defined how it would view public policy in 
unfairness cases:
 To the extent that the Commission relies heavily on public policy to support a 
finding of unfairness, the policy should be clear and well-established.  In other
words, the policy should be declared or embodied in formal sources such as 
statutes, judicial decisions, or the Constitution as interpreted by the courts,
rather than being ascertained from the general sense of the national values.  The
policy should likewise be one that is widely shared, and not the isolated decision of
a single state or a single court.  If these two tests are not met the policy cannot 
be considered as an “established” public policy for purposes of the S&H
criterion. The Commission would then act only on the basis of convincing
independent evidence that the practice was distorting the operation of the market 
and thereby causing unjustified consumer injury.84 
In any event, given that the considerations the FTC utilizes regarding 
public policy expressly relate to the examination of the first Sperry & 
Hutchinson factor, consumer injury, it is not surprising that the FTC
stated that it generally considered the violation of the public policy
prong to be part of its examination of the evidence of consumer injury
for the first Sperry & Hutchinson element.85 
3.  Unethical or Unscrupulous Conduct 
Although the FTC identified the third Sperry & Hutchinson factor in 
the Unfairness Statement, it dismissed it as largely duplicative.  In the 
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1074–75. 
84. Id. at 1076. 
85. Id. at 1075 (“As we have indicated before, the Commission believes that 
considerable attention should be devoted to the analysis of whether substantial net harm 
has occurred, not only because that is part of the unfairness test, but also because the
focus on injury is the best way to ensure that the Commission acts responsibly and uses 
its resources wisely.  Nonetheless, the Commission wishes to emphasize the importance
of examining outside statutory policies and established judicial principles for assistance 
in helping the agency ascertain whether a particular form of conduct does in fact tend to
harm consumers.  Thus the agency has referred to First Amendment decisions upholding 
consumers’ rights to receive information, for example, to confirm that restrictions on
advertising tend unfairly to hinder the informed exercise of consumer choice.”). 
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FTC’s view, conduct that was unethical would typically produce 
consumer injury or violate policy.86 
B.  Distilling the Unfairness Statement 
Ultimately, the focus on consumer injury in unfairness cases permits 
the distillation of the Sperry & Hutchinson factors into an examination 
of the consumer injury prong, which was ultimately codified in
section 5.87  At the time the Unfairness Statement was issued, there was 
a dispute over whether the FTC’s authority in certain areas, including 
children’s advertising, should be extended and whether its unfairness 
authority should be eliminated.  Ultimately, the Unfairness Statement
was codified by Congress via an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 45(n), which 
now reflects the consumer injury focus. Under this formulation a practice is
unfair if it (1) causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
(2) that is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and (3) not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.88 
Recognizing the FTC’s statements regarding the somewhat subordinate 
role of public policy, § 45(n) also states that “[i]n determining whether 
an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established 
public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence.
Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for 
such determination.”89  Consistent with these amendments, the FTC has 
stated its view that an act or practice is unfair if the injury it causes, or is
86. Id. at 1076 (“Finally, the third S&H standard asks whether the conduct was 
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous.  This test was presumably included in
order to be sure of reaching all the purposes of the underlying statute, which forbids 
‘unfair’ acts or practices.  It would therefore allow the Commission to reach conduct that 
violates generally recognized standards of business ethics.  The test has proven, however, to
be largely duplicative.  Conduct that is truly unethical or unscrupulous will almost
always injure consumers or violate public policy as well.  The Commission has therefore
never relied on the third element of S&H as an independent basis for a finding of
unfairness, and it will act in the future only on the basis of the first two.”). 
87. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 719, 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006)).
88. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 45(n)); Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(“Although Congress has subsequently solicited statements and held oversight hearings
on the question of whether the FTC’s unfairness authority should be eliminated or
permanently restricted, it has taken no definitive legislative action to define the limits of 
that authority.  Bills were introduced in both the 97th and 98th Congresses which would
have amended section 5 to provide a definition of unfair acts or practices.  The definition 
proposed in these bills was the definition supplied by the Commission at the request of 
Congress in a 1980 policy statement.” (footnotes omitted)). 
89. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
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likely to cause, is (1) substantial, (2) not outweighed by other benefits, 
and (3) not reasonably avoidable.90 
Although not many cases have litigated the scope of the FTC’s 
unfairness authority, there are some that have provided further guidance
and approved the factors referenced above.91 
C.  Unfairness and Harm-Based Enforcement Models 
As noted in the recent FTC report, the second privacy enforcement
model identified by the FTC was a harm-based model.  When the elements 
of the FTC’s unfairness authority are considered, particularly in light of 
the injury-centric analysis that has been adopted, it becomes clear that 
the FTC’s unfairness authority is a harm-based model of enforcement. 
X. ENFORCEMENT CASES
A.  In re GeoCities—A Traditional Deception Model
In re GeoCities was the first section 5 case arising from privacy
allegations.  In this case the FTC alleged that GeoCities engaged in
deceptive conduct by making misrepresentations in its privacy policy,
including that it would “NEVER give your information to anyone
without your permission.”92  The FTC’s specific allegations included 
that GeoCities had represented, expressly or by implication, that the 
personal identifying information collected through its “new member
application” form was used only for limited purposes—for the purpose 
of providing to members the specific e-mail advertising offers and other
products or services they requested—but in actuality the personal
identifying information collected through GeoCities’ new member 
application form was not just used for those limited purposes.  The FTC
 90. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVERTISING AND MARKETING ON THE INTERNET: RULES 
OF THE ROAD 2 (2000). 
91. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1364–65 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(applying Unfairness Statement factors); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 292–93 (7th
Cir. 1976) (citing with approval the Sperry & Hutchinson unfairness factors); FTC v. 
IFC Credit Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 925, 937 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“The legislative history
demonstrates that Congress’s intent was to codify the FTC’s Unfairness Policy
Statement of 1980, which was contained in a letter in response to a request from the
Consumer Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
requesting the Commission’s views on cases under § 5.”).
92. GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 96–98 (1999) (complaint). 
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also alleged that GeoCities had sold, rented, or otherwise marketed or 
disclosed this information, including information collected from
children, to third parties who used this information for purposes other 
than those for which members had given permission.93  The FTC 
therefore alleged that the representations made by GeoCities were false 
and misleading.94 
The matter was resolved via consent judgment, with a twenty-year
duration, that placed a number of requirements that would over time
become more familiar to companies that became subject to consent 
judgments.95  These included the requirement that GeoCities: 
• Not make any misrepresentation, expressly or by implication, 
about its collection or use of personal identifying information 
from or about consumers;
• Not misrepresent the identity of the party collecting any
personal identifying information from consumers or the
sponsorship of any activity on its website;
• Not collect personal identifying information from any child if
GeoCities has actual knowledge that the child does not have a 
parent’s permission to provide the information;
• Post a clear and prominent notice on its website explaining 
GeoCities’ practices with regard to its collection and use of
personal identifying information.  The notice must include the 
following: (1) what information is being collected, (2) its
intended use(s), (3) the third parties to whom it will be disclosed, 
(4) how the consumer can obtain access to the information,
and (5) how the consumer can have the information removed
from GeoCities’ databases.  The notice must appear on the
website’s home page and at each location on the site at which
such information is collected, although the collection of so-
called tracking information need only be disclosed on the
home page;
• Implement a procedure to obtain “express parental consent” 
prior to collecting and using children’s identifying information, a
procedure commonly referred to as “opt-in”;
• Notify all consumers—in the case of children, their parents— 
and give them an opportunity to have their information
removed from GeoCities’ and third parties’ databases;
93. Id. at 97–98. 
94. Id.
95. This matter was also the first children’s online enforcement matter, which occurred
prior to the enactment of COPPA. 
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• Retain certain personally identifiable information in its
“archived database” for the limited purposes of site maintenance, 
computer file backup, blocking a child’s attempt to register 
without parental consent, or responding to requests for such
information from law enforcement agencies or pursuant to 
judicial process.  GeoCities must disclose its retention of 
information in the archived database in its privacy notice;
• For five years, place a clear and prominent hyperlink within 
its privacy notice directing visitors to the FTC’s website to 
view educational material on consumer privacy;
• Meet certain recordkeeping requirements;
• Deliver a copy of the order to certain company officers and 
personnel;
• Establish an “information practices training program” for
employees and GeoCities’ community leaders, volunteers who 
provide a variety of services to GeoCities’ members; and 
• Notify the Commission of any change in its corporate structure
that might affect compliance with the order; and file compliance 
reports with the Commission.96 
This matter presented what would become a traditional model for the 
FTC in privacy matters—companies making representations that the
FTC alleged were untrue and these representations serving as the basis
for a claim that the respondent had engaged in deceptive conduct under 
section 5.  This would remain the pattern of enforcement for a number of
years,97 though as will be shown by the following consent judgments, 
there was some indication that deception would not be the exclusive
basis for FTC enforcement in the privacy arena. 
B.  In re ReverseAuction.com, Inc.—The Appearance of Unfairness 
The FTC led a complaint against ReverseAuction.com based upon the 
allegation that the company had wrongfully signed into eBay’s website 
and obtained personally identifiable information about users, including
e-mail addresses and eBay ratings.98  Reverseauction.com then allegedly 
96. Geocities, 127 F.T.C. at 123–32 (decision and order). 
97. See, e.g., Telebrands Corp., 140 F.T.C. 278, 368 (2003) (complaint), aff’d, 457
F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2006); Unither Pharma, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 145, 162 (2003) (complaint).
98. Complaint, FTC v. Reverseauction.com, Inc., FTC File. No. 002-3046 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 6, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reversecmp.htm. 
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took this information and spammed the eBay users, falsely representing
their eBay accounts were going to expire.  ReverseAuction.com was a 
competitor of eBay, and it was alleged to have done this to promote its 
own website.99  The matter was based upon an alleged misrepresentation, as
was GeoCities, but for the first time, as an alternative theory, the FTC 
charged that the misrepresentation was also an unfair practice.100  When
the consent judgment and complaint were reviewed by the commissioners, 
it drew separate opinions from three of the commissioners—Thompson, 
Swindle, and Leary—regarding the alternative use of the FTC’s unfairness
authority.101  Commissioners Swindle and Leary concurred in part and
dissented in part because although they supported the assertion that the 
practices of ReverseAuction.com were deceptive, they disagreed with 
the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority because the conduct at issue did 
not give rise to substantial injury.102 
99. Id.
100. Id. (“In the alternative, ReverseAuction’s use of the e-mail addresses, eBay user 
IDs, and feedback ratings of eBay registered users for the purposes of sending unsolicited
commercial e-mail, in violation of its agreement to comply with eBay’s User Agreement, 
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, 
and therefore was, and is, an unfair practice.”).
101. FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., FTC File No. 002-3046 (D.D.C. Jan 6, 2000)
(Swindle & Leary, Comm’rs, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(n) (2006)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reverses1.htm; id. (Thompson,
Comm’r, dissenting), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reversemt.htm.
 102. Commissioners Swindle and Leary dissented: 
We do not, however, support the unfairness theory in Count One.  The 
Commission has no authority to declare an act or practice unfair unless it “causes 
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.” 
Id. (Swindle & Leary, Comm’rs, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(n)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reverses1.htm.  The commissioners
continue:
The statutory requirement of substantial injury is actually derived from the 
Commission’s own Statement of Policy, issued in 1980.  The Commission 
explained at that time that, “[t]he Commission is not concerned with trivial or 
merely speculative harms.  In most cases a substantial injury involves monetary
harm . . . .  Unwarranted health and safety risks may also support a finding of 
unfairness.  Emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm, on the 
other hand, will not ordinarily make a practice unfair.” 
We do not say that privacy concerns can never support an unfairness claim. 
In this case, however, ReverseAuction’s use of eBay members’ information to 
send them e-mail did not cause substantial enough injury to meet the statutory
standard.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Unfairness Statement, supra note 71, at 1070–76). 
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Commissioner Thompson believed that the conduct of 
ReverseAuction.com had caused substantial injury to consumers and thus 
believed that the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority was proper.103 
Specifically, Commissioner Thompson stated: 
I believe the harm caused in this case is especially significant because it not
only breached the privacy expectation of each and every eBay member, it also
undermined consumer confidence in eBay and diminishes the electronic marketplace
for all its participants.  This injury is exacerbated because consumer concern about
privacy and confidence in the electronic marketplace are such critical issues at
this time.104 
Ultimately, Commissioner Thompson’s view prevailed, and as is 
shown by later cases, the FTC ultimately went beyond this initial foray 
into unfairness. 
103. Commissioner Thompson dissented: 
 I believe that ReverseAuction’s behavior caused substantial injury to 
members of the eBay community, that the injury could not have been avoided
by those members, and it was not outweighed by countervailing benefits. 
I believe the harm caused in this case is especially significant because it not 
only breached the privacy expectation of each and every eBay member, it also
undermined consumer confidence in eBay and diminishes the electronic
marketplace for all its participants.  This injury is exacerbated because
consumer concern about privacy and confidence in the electronic marketplace 
are such critical issues at this time.
In voting for an alternative pleading, the Commission does not here declare 
that sending unsolicited commercial e-mail (“spamming”) is unfair in all
circumstances, nor does it suggest that privacy invasions cause substantial 
injury in all circumstances.  Instead, the Commission posits that, under the
facts presented here, it is unfair for ReverseAuction to improperly obtain personal 
information for its use.  Accordingly, a majority of the Commission believes 
that the specific relationship, obligations, and expectations of this electronic 
community make ReverseAuction’s behavior “unfair” under Section 5.  Moreover,
the injury caused by ReverseAuction’s conduct, far from being speculative, is
a tangible misappropriation of personal protected information that enabled the
company to send personalized deceptive e-mail messages to scores of consumers.
In its statement on Touch Tone, a majority of the Commission recognized that, 
“Section 5 of the FTCA deliberately incorporates a flexible standard, so that
the Commission may react to changes in the marketplace.”  For these reasons,
I believe this action is not an overly expansive view of the unfairness doctrine, 
but instead represents a reasoned and tailored response to the circumstances
presented.
























   
















C.  In re Eli Lilly—Voluntary Assumption of Heightened Burdens 
Eli Lilly was one of the first FTC actions that addressed, at least
implicitly, a company’s voluntary assumption of heightened privacy
burdens arising from representations made to consumers.105  This matter
arose from an e-mail that Eli Lilly sent to customers taking Prozac.106 
Instead of masking the names in the e-mail, Eli Lilly included all of the 
customers’ names.  The company had made specific representations on 
its website regarding its concern for customer privacy on its website, and 
these representations were relied upon by the FTC in its assertion that 
Eli Lilly had violated the FTCA.107  The case is generally perceived as
supporting the view that the FTC will read statements regarding concern
for customer privacy as creating heightened burdens.  It also for the first 
time focused on the alleged lack of employee training, in that the FTC 
alleged that the company unreasonably failed to provide appropriate
training for its employees regarding consumer privacy and information 
security, provide appropriate training and oversight for the employee
who sent the e-mail, and implement appropriate checks on employees
who used sensitive customer data.108 
Although the theory was novel in other ways for the FTC, the complaint 
in this matter focused on the traditional allegation of a misrepresentation
that was considered to be deceptive and did not contain the alternative
count allegations regarding unfairness that the ReverseAuction.com
matter did, and the unfairness count that raised issues in ReverseAuction.com
did not surface again for several years. 
D.  In re Microsoft—A Continuation of Eli Lilly
Microsoft was the second case that dealt with heightened privacy
burdens created by a privacy policy, and this matter dealt with the issue 
much more directly than the Eli Lilly matter.  Microsoft was alleged to 
have made a number of representations regarding privacy, including that 
it followed “strict” privacy policies.109 The FTC alleged that in fact 
Microsoft did not maintain a high level of security and did not use
reasonable and appropriate measures to maintain privacy or security.110 
The FTC also alleged that Microsoft had made misrepresentations regarding
105. See Eli Lilly & Co., 133 F.T.C. 763, 789–90 (2002) (analysis of proposed
consent order). 
106. Id. at 789. 
107. Id. at 789–90.
108. See id. at 790. 
109. See Microsoft Corp., 134 F.T.C. 709, 710–11 (2002). 
110. See id. at 712. 
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the amount of personally identifiable information it collected.111  This  
matter clearly stated the FTC’s view that statements in a privacy policy
to the effect that a company has implemented heightened privacy and
security standards will bind the company to burdens that may be in 
excess of what the law would otherwise require.112 
E.  Misrepresentations Serving as the Basis for a      
Section 5 Deception Claim
The FTC continued to bring section 5 enforcement actions against 
companies that made misrepresentations regarding privacy or information 
security for several years.  These included In re National Research Center
for College & University Admissions, Inc.;113 In re Educational Research 
Center of America, Inc.;114 In re Guess?, Inc.;115 In re MTS, Inc.;116 In re 
Gateway Learning Corp.;117 and In re Petco Animal Supplies, Inc.118  All 
of these cases, although different in certain ways, presented the
traditional model of FTC enforcement: alleged misrepresentations 
regarding information security and privacy that gave rise to a section 5 
claim that did not, like ReverseAuction.com, directly rely upon the 
FTC’s unfairness authority. 
F.  In re Vision I Properties, LLC—A New Model of Deception 
In the case of In re Vision I Properties, LLC, the FTC started an 
investigation of a company that provided a shopping cart service for
other e-commerce websites.119  These websites made specific representations
regarding privacy, including that personal information was not sent, 
sold, or leased to third parties.  The FTC alleged that CartManager, a
company that provided shopping cart services for these websites,
violated the FTCA.120  In most cases, the portions of the websites gathering 
the information were CartManager’s, but CartManager did not disclose
111. See id. at 714–15. 
112. See discussion supra Part X.C. 
 113. 135 F.T.C. 13 (2003). 
 114. 135 F.T.C. 578 (2003). 
 115. 136 F.T.C. 507 (2003). 
 116. 137 F.T.C. 444 (2004). 
 117. 138 F.T.C. 443 (2004). 
 118. 139 F.T.C. 102 (2005). 
 119. 139 F.T.C. 296, 297 (2005). 
120. Id. at 299. 
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that the information practices on these pages were different than the
other pages, and these pages appeared to be part of the same website.121 
The FTC claimed that CartManager also began renting information to
third parties despite the privacy statements made by the retailers.122 
CartManager also allegedly failed to disclose its information practices to
its clients.123 
This matter presented a different enforcement pattern.  Although it 
relied upon an alleged misrepresentation that was deceptive, it was not a 
direct representation to consumers because CartManager did not have
direct consumer contact.124 At the time, the matter raised the question of 
whether the FTC was shifting its enforcement pattern to move away
from always requiring an alleged misrepresentation to the consumer or if 
it viewed the misrepresentation to have flowed through CartManager’s 
customers to the consumers.  This question was answered in In re BJ’s
Wholesale Club, Inc.
G.  In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.
In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. represents a marked departure from 
prior FTC actions because it was the first time the FTC used its unfairness
authority and did not also allege deceptive practices for privacy and 
security misrepresentation.125  Thus, unlike other cases, deception was 
not an issue in this matter.
BJ’s Wholesale Club operated a number of membership warehouse 
stores.126  As part of its normal business, BJ’s accepted credit cards as a
form of payment from its members.127  BJ’s collected personally identifiable
information from its customers to authorize their credit cards.128  It also
used wireless technology, including wireless access points and
scanners, to monitor inventory.129  The FTC filed a complaint against 
BJ’s, alleging that it had failed to encrypt information while it was in
transit or stored on the network, stored personally identifiable information
in a file format that permitted anonymous access, failed to use readily
121. Id. at 298–99. 
122. Id. at 298. 
123. Id. at 299. 
124. Id. at 297. 
125. See BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 468 (2005) (complaint); see also
Joel B. Hanson, Liability for Consumer Information Security Breaches: Deconstructing FTC
Complaints and Settlements, SHIDLER J.L. COMM. & TECH., May 23, 2008, at 1, 3,
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/412/vol4_no4_art11.
pdf?sequence=1. 
126. BJ’s Wholesale Club, 140 F.T.C. at 466. 
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 466–67. 
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accessible security measures to limit access, failed to employ sufficient 
measures to detect unauthorized access or conduct security investigations, 
and created unnecessary business risks by storing information after it
had any further use for the information, in violation of bank rules.130 
The FTC alleged that as a result of this conduct millions of dollars in 
fraudulent purchases had been made.131 Though there was no federal 
statute that the company’s conduct violated directly, the FTC concluded
that these acts constituted an unfair business practice under the FTCA 
and brought an enforcement action against BJ’s.132  This matter also was
resolved via consent order, and the FTC required BJ’s to implement a 
comprehensive information security plan, obtain a security assessment, 
and file reports over the next twenty years, as well as other administrative
requirements.133 
This case is notable because it represents a different enforcement
pattern from prior FTC actions.  In the past, the FTC had only acted in
the security arena when a company was subject to heightened security
burdens—under statutes such as HIPAA, COPPA, or GLB—or the
company had made specific security promises.  Here, the FTC has shown 
that even in the absence of a specific representation or a statutory burden, 
companies can face enforcement action for a lack of information security 
based upon the FTC’s unfairness authority and not based upon deception. 
Thus, the unanswered question in In re Vision I Properties, LLC was
answered by the FTC, and it is clear that the FTC views the lack of 
information security, whether there is a deceptive statement to consumers or
not, as an unfair business practice.134 
H.  Other Unfairness Cases Based upon a Lack of    
Information Security 
Though In re BJ’s Wholesale was the first unfairness case based upon 
a lack of information security, it was certainly not the last.  In re DSW, 
130. Id. at 467. 
131. Id.
132. See id. at 468 (“As described in Paragraphs 7 and 8 above, respondent’s failure
to employ reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect personal information 
and files caused or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that is not offset by
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition and is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers.  This practice was an unfair act or practice.”).
133. See id. at 470–72 (decision and order). 
134. Id. at 468 (complaint); see, e.g., Vision I Props., LLC, 139 F.T.C. 296, 301–02
(2005). 
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Inc.,135 In re Reed Elsevier Inc. & Seisint, Inc.,136 In re TJX Cos., Inc.,137 In 
re CVS Caremark Corp.,138 though it also relied upon allegations of
deception, and In re Dave & Busters, Inc.139 all relied upon the FTC’s
unfairness authority to allege that a lack of data security, even without an
alleged misrepresentation regarding privacy, was sufficient to establish a
section 5 violation.
XI. THE CHALLENGES OF NOTICE-AND-CHOICE AND    
HARM-BASED MODELS 
In its recent guidance, the FTC recognized that the notice-and-choice 
and harm-based models of enforcement had been criticized for a number 
of reasons.  The notice-and-choice, deception, or Privacy 1.0 model,
which requires some form of misrepresentation but only requires a
likelihood of consumer injury, is perceived to have led to lengthy
privacy policies that consumers do not read, which truly defeats the
notice-and-choice theory completely.140  The harm-based, unfairness, or 
Privacy 2.0 model, which requires significant consumer harm, has also
been criticized by commentators for being too reactive,141 and as is
shown by the failures of privacy litigation, proving substantial harm is
an elusive and often difficult achievement.142 
Ultimately, although these concepts have formed the basis of the
FTC’s privacy enforcement efforts, the FTC recognized that these 
models had limitations, including the reactive nature of these doctrines.
135. 141 F.T.C. 117, 118–20 (2006) (complaint).
136. No. C-4226, 2008 WL 3150420, at *6 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008) (decision and order).
137. No. C-4227, 2008 WL 3150421, at *4 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008) (decision and order).
138. No. C-4259, 2009 WL 1892185, at *4 (F.T.C. June 18, 2009) (decision and
order). 
139. No. C-4291, 2010 WL 1249871, at *4 (F.T.C. Mar. 25, 2010) (consent 
agreement).
 140. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 26–27. 
141. See id. at 33 n.86 (“George Washington University Law School Professor 
Daniel Solove has criticized the harm-based approach for being too ‘reactive’ and called
for an architectural approach to protecting privacy that involves ‘creating structures to 
prevent harms from arising rather than merely providing remedies when harms occur.’”
(quoting Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 
54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1242 (2003)). 
142. See Andrew B. Serwin, Poised on the Precipice: A Critical Examination of
Privacy Litigation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 883, 885 (2009)
(“However, the road to plaintiffs’ recovery in privacy litigation is littered with a number 
of issues that can derail a case before it truly starts, not the least of which is that 
plaintiffs in many cases cannot prove actual damage, and may actually lack standing to
bring an action.  Moreover, even if the case clears this hurdle, many class actions fail the
certification requirements because of issues unique to privacy litigation.”); see also
Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060, 2010 WL 2643307, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (citing Serwin, supra, at 931–95). 
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That Privacy 2.0, the model advocated by Prosser and adopted by the 
FTC in its unfairness enforcement, has failed to address privacy 
concerns, particularly those created by innovation, is well established.143 
Privacy 2.0 is a harm- and tort-centric model created by courts when
their decisions were now-famously placed in context by Prosser.144 
It has been the touchstone for privacy since 1960, but as the FTC 
recognized, Privacy 2.0 has been criticized for being too reactive and not 
keeping pace with innovation.145  Indeed, to understand the latency of
litigation one need only ask someone who is a party to it to describe his 
or her view of how long litigation can take to resolve.  Moreover, based
upon the past history of Privacy 2.0, it is clear that a litigation-based
model will inherently fail to provide proactive guidance.  Guidance under
the Privacy 2.0 model comes from what published decisions are made by
courts, or the few public settlements entered by government agencies,
such as the FTC or state attorneys general.  In many cases private 
litigation settles on confidential terms, and in any case, guidance under
the Privacy 2.0 model is inherently limited by the discovery of issues 
and a party’s, governmental or otherwise, willingness to litigate the 
problem.  There are also jurisdictional limits on privacy litigation, both 
for private parties and for the FTC.146 
These points illustrate, as more fully discussed below, that models
based upon accountability—meaning enforcement—have already been 
tried in the United States and have failed.  Both Privacy 1.0 and 2.0 
focused on enforcement as the model to drive compliance, and the FTC,
as well as many other commentators, recognized the limitations of these 
models.147  This led the FTC to suggest a new model that was more
proactive and provided more flexibility—the privacy-by-design 
framework.148  Although the model is a significant step in the right
 143. Solove, supra note 141, at 1228, 1232–33. 
144. See Prosser, supra note 31, at 383, 389. 
145. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii.
146. Private parties face the problem that harm is often difficult to prove.  The FTC 
faces the issue that its jurisdiction is not unlimited, and it can only act under section 5 if
it can prove deception and a likelihood of harm or consumer injury that is “substantial.” 
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
147. See, e.g., Note, In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of
Privacy Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1870, 1891 (2007) (“The dangers that accompany
Privacy 2.0 . . . are capable of more invasive and damaging harms than were conceivable at
the birth of the Internet.  The law has yet to catch up to these new harms, but now it is 
time to try.” (footnote omitted)).
 148. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 39–41. 
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direction, it will need to be defined in a more complete way before it can 
be implemented by businesses in a meaningful way.149  
XII. UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED MODELS FOR PRIVACY
There are in essence three main proposed constructs for privacy being 
discussed.  It is helpful to understand these models and what they propose in
order to try and chart a path forward.  Before that is examined, it is 
helpful to understand the basic structure of existing privacy laws and
internal policies.  Although privacy-by-design is a model being discussed, it
is a model focused on implementation of privacy, and it is best placed in 
the first or second elements of what is discussed below. 
Privacy laws do in essence three things: (1) classify or identify data
that is to be regulated; (2) regulate the processing of data through 
conduct limitations, including the level of consent required to collect or 
use the data, data security limitations, use restrictions, and other limitations; 
and (3) provide for enforcement for violation of point (2).  Internal
policies that are adopted at companies regarding data governance do
effectively the same thing: define what data is being covered, restrict its 
use, and provide for some form of enforcement, though the enforcement
is much different from a consumer class action or an FTC enforcement
action. 
The point of identifying these three elements is to give context for the
models that are being discussed, to help define what these models are
and what they are not, and to argue that proportionality is the key principle 
that must be the basis of any new regime. 
A.  Model 3—Accountability 
Models based upon accountability have been put forward by some as a 
viable solution to the privacy concerns of today, including the reactive 
nature of current privacy regimes.150 You will note that though this is
the first model I discuss, I list it as the third model, and the reason for 
that will become clear below. 
149. Flexibility in meeting the challenges of the Web 2.0 has long been recognized
as necessary by the FTC.  Slade Bond, Comment, Doctor Zuckerberg: Or, How I Learned To
Stop Worrying and Love Behavioral Advertising, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 143 
(2010) (citing Joel Winston, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Report: Self-Regulatory 
Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising: Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting,
& Technology, in 2 PRACTISING LAW INST., TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY AND 
DATA SECURITY LAW 411, 431 (2009)). 
150. See, e.g., Sudhir Aggarwal et al., Trust-Based Internet Accountability: Requirements
and Legal Ramifications, J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2010, at 3, 3–6. 
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1.  Prior Concerns Regarding Accountability 
Although accountability has gained attention in recent times in the 
privacy realm, it is not a new concept in privacy and is in fact a concept 
that has been discussed in a number of different governance contexts.
Although accountability has a role in governance, accountability is a 
concept that has been questioned at some level by other commentators. 
In an article that examined the role of accountability in public administration, 
one of the main challenges with accountability—defining what it actually 
means—was identified.151  Noting the “chameleon” quality of accountability,
one author noted, “Accountability is a cherished concept, sought after 
but elusive.  New models of administrative reform promise to provide 
heightened accountability through managerial controls.  Interviews with
15 Chief Executives of Australian public sector organisations reveal the 
chameleon quality of accountability.  Accountability is subjectively
construed and changes with context.”152 
Accountability has also been noted by some scholars as being an ever-
expanding concept that has gone beyond its original purpose—external 
enforcement.
But more recently, in academic usage at least, “accountability” has increasingly
been extended beyond these central concerns and into areas where the various
features of core “accountability” no longer apply.  For instance, “accountability” 
now commonly refers to the sense of individual responsibility and concern for
the public interest expected from public servants (“professional” and “personal” 
accountability), an “internal” sense which goes beyond the core external focus of the 
term.  Secondly, “accountability” is also said to be a feature of the various
institutional checks and balances by which democracies seek to control
the actions of the governments (accountability as “control”) even when there is no
interaction or exchange between governments and the institutions that control
them.  Thirdly, “accountability” is linked with the extent to which governments 
pursue the wishes or needs of their citizens (accountability as “responsiveness”) 
regardless of whether they are induced to do so through processes of
authoritative exchange and control.153 
Although some scholars have proposed solutions to these issues,
acceptance of accountability, particularly in an expanded form, is far
from unanimous.  These concerns are important to factor in when
accountability models for privacy are examined. 
 151. Amanda Sinclair, The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Disclosures, 
20 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 219, 219–22 (1995). 
152. Id. at 219. 
 153. Richard Mulgan, ‘Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 
555, 556 (2000). 
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2.  Accountability and Privacy 
Accountability models in the privacy arena are, not surprisingly, 
focused on holding people accountable for what they do with data.  “As a
result, a growing faction in the cryptography and security community
has embraced greater reliance on accountability mechanisms: When an 
action occurs, it should be possible to determine (perhaps after the fact) 
whether a rule has been violated and, if so, to punish the violators in 
some way.”154  Although accountability-based models must have rules of
the road regarding a variety of topics, including security, use restrictions, 
and restrictions on third-party transfers, to mete out punishment for 
violation, an accountability model generally focuses on after-the-fact
enforcement.
Apart from the general criticisms of accountability noted above, the
flaw in a model that focuses on accountability is clearer to understand
when one reexamines the three elements of laws identified above.
A focus on accountability means a focus on the third element, which is 
the least important of the three elements.  More importantly, a focus on 
enforcement ignores the last fifty years of privacy law in the United 
States, as well as the inherently retrospective nature of a model that is 
enforcement-centric.  Simply put, accountability models inherently must 
focus on after-the-fact enforcement to set standards, and that is the
opposite of a system that is proactive and voluntary—what the FTC is 
currently seeking. 
Other accountability advocates argue that the model should be
accountability-centric.155  The problem with this argument is two-fold. 
As noted above, enforcement-centric models have been tried in the
United States, and they have not worked, though external enforcement 
has been the basis of privacy theory since Prosser’s 1960 article, which 
was based upon a court-created tort-centric model.156  Moreover, to the
extent that what these advocates are saying is really that there should be 
penalties for violating the law, it is a point that cannot be disputed
because it underlies every existing law.  If that is truly the argument,
then it is not informative to privacy practitioners because there are 
always some consequences for violating a law and focusing on
154. Joan Feigenbaum, Accountability as a Driver of Innovative Privacy Solutions 2
(Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
pdf/ISP/Feigenbaum_Accountability.pdf. 
155. See, e.g., Jon S. Hoak, HP Ethics from the Top Down . . . and the Bottom Up, 
33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 225, 227–28 (finding that the accountability model best protects 
personal data and privacy standards). 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 143–46. 
846
SERWIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2011 1:29 PM       
 















     
    
   
   
  
 







[VOL. 48:  809, 2011] The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
consequences does not provide the proactive guidance the FTC seeks to
generate.157 
There are some accountability models that focus more on data owners’ 
being accountable for data in that they are required to take steps to 
control data, and this is seen as a way to encourage the adoption of best
practices, which is in essence an expansion of the external focus of 
accountability as noted by Mulgan.158  However, at this time there generally 
is not a fixed definition around what data should be protected and how it 
should be protected.  Instead, there may be reference to internal values 
regarding information, or ethics, which highlights the chameleon quality
of accountability concepts.159  Said differently, the challenge with these
types of accountability models is that information ethics is in the eye of 
the beholder.  Left to their own devices, what privacy-centric and
nonprivacy-centric companies will conclude is appropriate will vary 
dramatically, as noted by the FTC in its recent report.160  Therefore,
these models provide little guidance to companies that are not culturally 
privacy-centric and will not solve the problem as articulated by the FTC. 
It should also be noted that any model based upon accountability
inherently focuses on privacy in a different way than privacy-by-design. 
Privacy-by-design is a way to embed privacy into technology, and its 
express purpose is proactive prevention, not after-the-fact enforcement.
Indeed, the first of the seven principles of privacy-by-design is: 
 The privacy-by-design (PbD) approach is characterized by proactive rather
than reactive measures.  It anticipates and prevents privacy invasive events before 
they happen.  PbD does not wait for privacy risks to materialize, nor does it offer
remedies for resolving privacy infractions once they have occurred—it aims to
prevent them from occurring.  In short, privacy-by-design comes before-the-fact, not
after.161 
Given any accountability model’s inherent retrospective view,
accountability and privacy-by-design are not concepts that take the same 
view of how to improve privacy.  To the extent that accountability
advocates argue that privacy-by-design makes organizations more 
157. See supra Part XI and note 146.  For a general discussion of privacy litigation, 
see ANDREW B. SERWIN, 2 INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND COMPLIANCE § 28 (2010). 
 158. Mulgan, supra note 153, at 555–56. 
159. Id. at 555–60. 
160. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2. 
 161. Ann Cavoukian, The 7 Foundational Principles, PRIVACY BY DESIGN (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf. 
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accountable for the data throughout the organization, this is really more
a concept of responsibility for implementing appropriate processing
restrictions, which is really a focus on the second point of three.
Accountability as a model looks at enforcement, and an enforcement 
model without clear focus on data classification and processing 
limitations is an empty vessel that provides no guidance, which is what
proportionality principles provide.  At some level an accountability-
centric model would be like passing comprehensive privacy legislation 
and simply saying, “If you violate someone’s privacy you will be liable 
for a $10,000 fine,” without defining what data is covered or what acts 
are prohibited.  This is not what accountability advocates have put
forward, and that guidance can be built in through data classification and 
processing limitations, but that illustrates the point—accountability is 
the third step in a three-step process and therefore should not be the
focal point of privacy theory, particularly because the experience in the 
United States demonstrates accountability models have not worked.
B.  Model 2—Models Based upon Processing Limitations 
There is an emerging model of privacy that focuses on restrictions on 
processing of information, which are in some circles referred to as use-
limitation models, though they go beyond mere use limitations.  It is
worth noting here that some advocates for privacy view use-limitation
models as accountability models.162  They are not.  Use limitation is focused 
on restricting the use of information.  Although there may be consequences 
for misuse, that does not turn a model focused on use restriction into an 
accountability model any more than it turns every existing privacy law 
in the United States that restricts the use of data into an accountability
statute.  This also becomes clear when one examines the OECD Guidelines 
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.163 
The OECD Guidelines identify a number of principles regarding the 
use of data. Three of them are of particular importance.  First is the
purpose specification principle, which states:
162. Andrew Shen, Comment to Online Profiling Project, P994809/Docket No. 
990811219-9219-01, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 8, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/
profiling/comments/shen.htm. 
163. See  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA 3, 15 (1980), 
available at http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/OECD_FIPs.pdf. 
848
SERWIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2011 1:29 PM       
 
    
 

























[VOL. 48:  809, 2011] The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not 
later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the
fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those 
purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.164 
This is clearly a use-based principle.  Second is the use-limitation
principle, which states that “[p]ersonal data should not be disclosed, 
made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified
in accordance with Paragraph 9 except: a) with the consent of the data 
subject; or b) by the authority of law.”165  Again, this is a use-based 
principle that is similar to what some have advocated.  If accountability
were about use limitation, these principles would be the accountability
principle.  They are not.  There is also an accountability principle that 
states that a “data controller should be accountable for complying with
measures which give effect to the principles stated above.”166  In other
words, accountability is the enforcement mechanism for other principles 
that are defined in other ways.  Without the other principles, accountability 
is simply an empty vessel, and use-based models provide a part of the
framework needed for accountability.
Although use-based models themselves are not inherently incorrect,
they focus on the second point of law, as noted above.  Restrictions on
the use of information are critical to any system, but they cannot be the 
underlying basis of the system because the decisions to restrict use must 
be based upon something, which is step one in the analysis.  To continue 
the analogy from above, it would be like passing legislation that provides 
restrictions on the use of data without defining data in the first place.
Again, that is not what advocates of use-based systems are arguing for, 
but it again illustrates the point that use-based restrictions only truly
function as part of a system of proportional protections and penalties. 
C.  Model 1—Proportionality 
In Privacy 3.0, I argued that it was widely recognized that the current 
theoretical construct of privacy—Prosser’s tort-based enforcement or 
accountability model—had failed.167  What was needed was a model that 
provided appropriate but not overinclusive or underinclusive protection,
164. Id. at 3. 
165. Id.
166. Id. at 4. 
 167. Serwin, supra note 8, at 874–75. 
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particularly in the rapidly changing Web 2.0 world where information
sharing was the basis of a number of now-ubiquitous services, such as
Facebook.168 
I also recognized that society would benefit from information sharing,
though there should be restrictions, or use limitations, on the sharing.
Instead, a theory of proportional protection places higher restrictions and access
barriers on truly sensitive information that either has limited or no use to third-
parties and has great capacity to damage individuals and society, while
simultaneously permitting the necessary and appropriate access to those having
a legitimate need to know certain information, particularly when that information is
less sensitive.  Proportionality also has the advantage of minimizing the societal
impact of privacy issues because enforcement and compliance will be focused
on the most appropriate levels of sensitive information.169 
In other words, use limitations should be proportional to the sensitivity 
of data. 
Although an examination of data elements for sensitivity could lead to
improving privacy protection, that model did not seem to provide
prospective guidance.  As such, I proposed creating four tiers—highly 
sensitive, sensitive, slightly sensitive, and nonsensitive.170  By creating 
these tiers, one could associate certain use restrictions and enforcement
with each tier.171  As noted below, I did not simply focus on sensitivity 
as part of proportionality but rather as a broader set of issues that needed
to be defined once the four tiers of information were created.  Thus, 
there are common elements that I will be discussing regarding each tier,
including:
• whether information can be gathered without notice or consent; 
• whether consent must be opt-in or opt-out; 
• the effect of consent;
• the types of processing that can be done; 
• can information be gathered under false pretenses;
• are there time restrictions upon the retention of the data; 
• data security requirements;
• data destruction requirements; 
168. When considering whether Prosser’s model works for the Web 2.0 world, I stated:
This Article argues that the answer is no and instead argues that the common 
law based prior scholarship was relevant for its day, but it cannot account for
the technology and societal values of today, our statutorily-driven privacy
protections, and the [FTC] enforcement centric model, and should therefore not 
provide the theoretical construct for existing or future laws or court decisions. 
This is all the more true in light of recent FTC guidance regarding behavioral 
advertising, in which the FTC expressly recognized the need to balance support 
for innovation and consumer protection, as well as the “benefits” provided to 
consumers by behavioral advertising. 
Id. at 874. 
169. Id. at 876. 
170. Id. at 900. 
171. See id. at 901. 
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• what steps are required, or permitted, to mitigate any mishandling of
information; and
• penalties for misuse of the information, including the imposition of 
statutory penalties in certain cases.172 
As is clear from these bullet points, use limitation, such as “the types 
of processing that can be done,” and the effect of consent as well as 
accountability, such as the “penalties for misuse of the information,
including the imposition of statutory penalties in certain cases,” are 
inherent in proportionality.173 
One could ask, How are these models different, and why should one
predominate?  The answer really is two-fold.  The Privacy 3.0 model, by 
starting but not ending the analysis with data sensitivity, permits business 
and government to more efficiently focus resources on protecting the 
information that can create the most mischief if lost or misused, while 
simultaneously avoiding overregulation of data as well.  Second, I think 
there is a significant “best practice” value in focusing first on sensitivity
in the way I articulated in 2008.174  As noted above, use limitation, consent, 
enforcement, and other issues would be defined by the tiers, not by the 
individual data elements themselves.  The data elements would be examined 
based upon sensitivity and then placed into a tier.  Once the individual 
data elements were placed into a tier, the use restrictions and other
issues would flow from the tier, not the data element. Current use-
limitation models tend to focus more on the data elements themselves,
and there are two advantages of the approach I advocated.  The first is
that data sensitivity can change over time, and this system permits more 
flexibility for data to move to a higher or lower tier. The second is that
it permits privacy to be more proactive.  When a new technology is
created that uses a new form of sensitive data, these tiers and the data
elements placed within them can be examined, and companies seeking
guidance can use past placement of data elements to appropriately 
protect new forms of data.  To the extent that advocates of accountability 
believe in an ethics- or value-based accountability system, the tiers 
permit companies to make value judgments regarding a large number of 
data sets, including emerging forms of data, in a consistent and cohesive 
way.
172. Id. at 901–02. 
173. Id. at 902. 
174. See id. at 900. 
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Some commentators have suggested that this model of privacy does 
not account for the context of information.175  This is an argument that
does not factor in the complete model of proportionality.  Although it is
true that a pure data sensitivity analysis does not capture each and every 
context for data, the other elements identified above that flow from data 
sensitivity do factor in the context of data, particularly when use
restrictions are created based upon sensitivity because the restrictions on 
use will vary in context and, more importantly, the restrictions will vary
depending on who is attempting to process the data. 
Ultimately, the issue is not choosing between use limitations,
accountability, or sensitivity but rather what the first step in the process 
is.  Focusing on proportionality in the method identified in Privacy 3.0
permits informed decisions to be made regarding use limitations and
accountability.  To focus on either without first addressing sensitivity so 
that use restrictions and accountability can be proportional runs the risk
of having either too few or too many restrictions. 
XIII. BAKING IT IN
There is a path that would provide more flexibility to the FTC and 
more guidance to business in the Web 2.0 World.  I have previously
proposed Privacy 3.0, which is a model based upon data sensitivity that 
makes the safeguards required to be implemented for personal information 
contextually connected to the sensitivity of that information using a 
proportional methodology.176  Although this may seem like a radical 
departure from prior FTC enforcement, if the concept is put into different
terms, it is truly just a small step away from prior guidance and enforcement, 
but this small step provides much-needed predictability and, perhaps 
even more importantly, flexibility as technology changes. 
Stated differently, examining the sensitivity of data through the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the individuals and the context 
of the personal information is simply determining the risk of harm that
can result from the improper or unauthorized disclosure or use of the 
personal information.  The more sensitive the data is, the higher the risk 
of harm to consumers.  This is a different approach at a certain level 
from the prior enforcement cases because although likelihood of harm is
considered by the FTC, it is typically only done so in the context of a 
deception case, which requires a misstatement of some kind regarding 
175. See, e.g., Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless 
World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 17 (2007). 
176. See generally Serwin, supra note 8 (describing the principal of proportionality
as it relates to Privacy 3.0).
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privacy.177  Otherwise, the level of consumer injury for unfairness goes
far beyond a risk of harm because actual harm appears to be required. 
Moreover, if Privacy 3.0 were considered, it would not directly be the 
basis of enforcement by the FTC.  Part of the rationale of using sensitivity
rather than the Privacy 1.0 and 2.0 doctrines is that harm is frequently
difficult to prove and therefore litigation frequently fails to address the 
stated concerns of individuals.  Therefore, I would propose that the risk 
of harm analysis be used to create the Privacy 3.0 framework and the 
framework would be the basis of a safe harbor program administered by
the FTC.  The “Privacy 3.0 Safe Harbor” program would rely upon the 
four tiers of sensitivity, and as more fully detailed in Privacy 3.0, it
would provide clear guidance regarding what information practices
were permitted for each tier, including what level of consent, both 
implicit and explicit, would be required to process data.178  Companies  
that agreed to and implemented the data classification framework, and 
the resulting restrictions and permissions that would be created based 
upon the sensitivity of information, would not be subject to enforcement 
action if there was a data incident.  However, companies that voluntarily
chose to participate in the Privacy 3.0 Safe Harbor would be subject to 
enforcement if they failed to meet the requirements of the program or 
falsely claimed to comply when they in fact did not.179 
This program could follow the model of the European Union (EU) 
Safe Harbor program180 or binding corporate rules (BCRs),181 which are 
177. See, e.g., Vision I Props., LLC, 139 F.T.C. 296 (2005) (finding that renting out 
personal information was deceptive and violated customer’s privacy).
 178. Serwin, supra note 8, at 902–06.  This safe harbor program would differ from 
the existing EU Safe Harbor program in its implementation and the contemplated level
of detail in the filings and commitments. See id. at 884–89. 
179. See, e.g., Onyx Graphics, Inc., 74 Fed. Reg. 53,503, 53,504 (F.T.C. Oct. 19, 
2009) (proposed consent agreement); Dirs. Desk LLC, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,247, 53,248–49
(F.T.C. Oct. 16, 2009) (proposed consent agreement); World Innovators, Inc., 74 Fed. 
Reg. 53,255, 53,256–57 (F.T.C. Oct. 16, 2009) (proposed consent agreement); Collectify
Inc., 74 Fed. Reg. 53,254, 53,255 (F.T.C. Oct. 16, 2009) (proposed consent agreement);
ExpatEdge Partners, LLC, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,250, 53,251–52 (F.T.C. Oct. 16, 2009) 
(proposed consent agreement); Progressive Gaitways Inc., 74 Fed. Reg. 53,249, 53,250 
(F.T.C. Oct 16, 2009) (proposed consent agreement). 
180. See Tracy DiLascio, How Safe is the Safe Harbor? U.S. and E.U. Data Privacy 
Law and the Enforcement of the FTC’s Safe Harbor Program, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J.
399, 415–16 (2004); U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/ 
safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 11, 2011).
181. See Overview—BCR, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/
binding_rules/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 4, 2010). 
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approaches many companies are now using to comply with EU data 
protection laws.  This would encourage international cooperation while 
simultaneously permitting companies that have implemented a program 
based upon the EU Safe Harbor or BCRs to build upon existing work by 
companies, though this model would focus protection on information by
doing a data risk analysis under the “principle of proportionality.”182 
An additional side benefit from an economic standpoint is that such a 
program would remove uncertainty from the information environment,
allowing organizations to provide protections and safeguards more
efficiently by focusing security and protective resources on those data
that are more sensitive.  In turn, this could provide the economic stimulus to
promote greater valuation in concepts such as privacy- or security-by-
design, which would be driven through economic value because of
reduced regulatory risk rather than using a sword of Damocles183 over
the head of any handler of consumer information—the carrot versus the 
stick approach.
This would give companies an incentive to proactively focus their 
compliance efforts on the most critical information and therefore 
proactively prevent consumer harm in many cases.  Without a focus on 
sensitivity, compliance efforts can often be unfocused and not as efficient or
as productive as otherwise possible. 
Whether this is accomplished via the FTC’s rulemaking authority,
referenced in section 7, or whether additional legislation is required, 
pursuing a framework that incorporates Privacy 3.0, includes a safe
harbor for those companies that choose to comply, and links in some
form to the existing EU models will provide the appropriate combination 
of protections and incentives for businesses so that proactive privacy
protection can be achieved in a way that maximizes international
coordination and cooperation.
After the publication of this Article on the Social Science
Research Network but prior to its publication in this journal, draft federal
privacy legislation was announced by Senator Kerry.184  The legislation 
182. See generally SERWIN, supra note 157, § 37, at 1480–86 (explaining Privacy
3.0, the principle of proportionality).  Tying the proposed program in some way to the existing 
BCR process would further the FTC’s goal of increasing international cooperation and 
would also give companies further incentives to pursue the BCR process.  It would also
streamline a number of the international data transfer issues, at least with the EU. FED.
TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2011: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 54
(2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/04/2011ChairmansReport.pdf. 
183. See Cavoukian, supra note 161. 
 184. Julia Angwin, Senators Offer Privacy Bill To Protect Personal Data, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870338540457625894226 
8540486.html; Press Release, John Kerry, Kerry Urges Common Sense Commercial Privacy
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includes some of the concepts discussed in this Article, including a safe 
harbor, and it distinguishes between sensitive personally identifiable 
information and personally identifiable information, though it presents a 
model that is somewhat of a use-based approach.185  This bill is discussed 
briefly because it is still in draft form and may be modified at a later
time.
The bill places restrictions on “covered entit[ies].”186  The term covered 
entity is defined as “any person who collects, uses, transfers or stores
covered information concerning more than 5,000 individuals during
any consecutive 12-month period” and is subject to FTC jurisdiction, as
well as common carrier and nonprofit organizations.187  The information 
covered by the bill includes (1) personally identifiable information;
(2) sensitive personally identifiable information, which is personally
identifiable information that “if lost, compromised, or disclosed without 
authorization . . . carries significant risk of economic or physical harm”;
and (3) unique identifiable information, defined as “a unique persistent 
identifier associated with an individual or a networked device.”188 
Additionally, the bill covers “any information that is collected . . . in
connection with personally identifiable information or unique identifier
information.”189 
The bill creates obligations by creating certain rights for individuals,
and through this, the bill creates certain compliance obligations on covered 
entities.190  This includes the right to security and accountability, which 
requires the FTC to institute a rulemaking process within 180 days to 
implement this right.191  There is also a right to notice and individual 
participation, as well as the right to purpose specification, data
minimization, constraints on distribution, and data integrity.192  Violation 
of these requirements and the implementing rules is considered to be an 
Protections (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=d18a 
9191-7fa3-437c-af24-3b6ca3a28f10. 
185. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. §§ 3(6),
202(b), 501(a) (2011); Angwin, supra note 184. 
 186. S. 799 § 3(2); Andrew Serwin & Megan O’Sullivan, New Post on the 
Kerry Bill, PRIVACY & SECURITY SOURCE (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.privacysecurity
source.com/new-post-on-the-kerry-bill/. 
187. S. 799 §§ 3(2)–(3), 401. 
188. Id. § 3(3), (6), (9). 
189. Id. § 3(3)(A)(iii).
190. Id. §§ 101, 201, 301. 
191. Id. § 101(a). 
192. See id. §§ 201–202, 301–303. 
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unfair and deceptive trade practice under the FTCA.193  This bill can be
enforced by the FTC or state attorneys general, and civil penalties are 
available for the violation of the bill.194  There is no private right of 
action for the violation of the bill, and the bill would preempt many
aspects of existing state laws, though there are several carve-outs from 
preemption.195 
The bill also contains a safe harbor for a company that creates its own
program that exempts the company from compliance with the FTCA,
though the program must be “substantially the same as or more protective
of privacy” than the requirements of the bill.196 
The bill is still in draft form, and it is unclear what modifications, if 
any, will be made before it is introduced and whether it will be 
considered by Congress and adopted, but it is an important first step in 
the process of creating federal privacy legislation that encourages the
adoption of comprehensive privacy programs, though it does not 
incorporate certain ideas that are suggested in this Article that would 
likely encourage broader adoption of best practices.197 
XIV. CONCLUSION
Whatever nomenclature is used to describe Privacy 1.0 and 2.0, it 
cannot be questioned that these models have failed, and the FTC’s report 
raises legitimate questions about prior privacy enforcement models and
their value in a Web 2.0 world.  Given the current business models of the 
Internet, privacy models must change in order to create the appropriate
incentives for business to adopt best practices and protect consumer
privacy in an appropriate way.  If change is truly desired, then we must 
turn away from prior failed models, such as enforcement-centric models
that have not worked and that have been criticized by many scholars.
The new path must provide appropriate incentives for business to adopt
best practices that are proportional to the sensitivity of data.  In short, 
Privacy 3.0 must be based upon the principle of proportionality.
193. Id. § 402 (“A knowing or repetitive violation of a provision of this Act . . . shall be
treated as an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of a regulation under section 
18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)) regarding 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”). 
194. See id. §§ 402–404. 
195. Id. §§ 405–406. 
196. Id. § 502(a). 
197. The bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, the first step in the legislative process.  See S. 799: Commercial Privacy Bill
Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s112-799 (last
updated May 2, 2011). 
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